 GPT Infraprojects Ltd receives order worth Rs. 195 crore
GPT Infraprojects Ltd receives order worth Rs. 195 crore Acknit Industries Ltd to close operations at Unit 1 in Falta Special Economic Zone
Acknit Industries Ltd to close operations at Unit 1 in Falta Special Economic Zone Bhagyanagar India Ltd Q2FY26 consolidated PAT higher at Rs. 11.27 crores
Bhagyanagar India Ltd Q2FY26 consolidated PAT higher at Rs. 11.27 crores Zen Technologies Ltd Q2 FY2025-26 consolidated profit increases QoQ to Rs. 59.39 crores
Zen Technologies Ltd Q2 FY2025-26 consolidated profit increases QoQ to Rs. 59.39 crores Seshasayee Paper and Boards Ltd consolidated Q2FY26 PAT up QoQ at Rs. 22.41 crores
Seshasayee Paper and Boards Ltd consolidated Q2FY26 PAT up QoQ at Rs. 22.41 crores 
              Mr. Jay Gandhi, Institutional Research Analyst, HDFC Securities
The view from a disruptor's lens is a salivating one as short of a few well-capitalised operators, the organised Food & Grocery ecosystem remains (1) profitless, (2) cash-strapped and (3) supported by increasing crutches (high gross margins, inefficient cost structures and increasing vendor support). Our read-through across the ecosystem suggests (1) the phase of capital dumping by global/domestic biggies may soon be upon us, (2) selection/pricing arbitrage vis-a-vis industry bellwether DMART continues to shrink, (3) margin cracks are imminent and (4) Reliance Retail-FRL combination could change the complexion of competition in top Indian districts.
Capital dumping is likely to take center-stage: Global/domestic retailers Amazon, Walmart-backed Flipkart and Reliance Retail (refer link) have significantly strengthened their war chests for investments in supply chain, fulfillment capabilities and pricing/selection. An inkling of this can already be seen in the reducing selection/pricing arbitrage of DMART over these biggies. Fulfillment/supply chain investments of Amazon's F&G unit (adj. for scale) is already >6x that of DMART's (Comparison: DMART Ready vs Amazon). Former remains aggressive on footprint expansion.
Margin crack for ecosystem is imminent: Over FY15-20, despite low competitive intensity, most organised grocers' sales velocity (1-4% CAGR) has undershot inflation, signaling a gradual but structural footfall reduction. Most (1) continue to hide behind high gross margins as cost of retailing remains inefficient and (2) have bare-bone investments in online fulfilment capabilities. Moreover, as subsidised home delivery becomes table stakes, even the best (D-MART) may get arm-twisted into bringing a part of online fulfillment costs on their books (not factored in, remains a risk to estimates). Thus, the imperative to remain competitive (reducing GMs) + rising cost of retailing is likely to crack operational margins for the ecosystem over FY21-25.This has played out globally too (Walmart's CY15-20 margin crack).
Reliance + Future Retail > DMART in store density: Post integration and, if executed well, the Reliance Retail + FRL store network is likely to get nearly as dense as DMART's (Refer table) in the latter's key markets (HSIE: 48% of DMART's stores, 65-70% of revenue). These markets are the most populated/over-retailed districts in India with high PCI. Hence, the rise in competitive intensity/price action and near-zero sourcing margin arbitrage seems to be a foregone conclusion. The high population density in these districts could help fulfill JioMART orders within controlled costs too.
Meanwhile, well-funded e-grocers are scaling up nicely: Even pre-COVID19, e-grocers had been scaling up nicely. The concoction of (1) higher AoVs and GMs (3) lower CACs and (4) better national brands representation has changed the complexion of online grocers' P&L during the pandemic.
Survivors don't offer any margin of safety: While consolidation in F&G is imminent, survivors (DMART) do not offer any margin of safety at 75x+ FY23 P/E. DMART's growth is likely to be healthy (21/23/23% revenue/EBITDA/PAT CAGR), largely underpinned by network expansion. Alas, pressure on sales velocity and margins remains probabilistically high as deep-pocketed operators enter DMART's key catchments. We maintain our SELL recommendation on DMART with a DCF-based TP: 2,160/sh - implying 34x FY23 EV/EBITDA + 2x FY23 sales for e-comm. Note: we currently have an SOTP-based fair value of Rs. 3,743bn for RRVL, implying 20x FY23 EV/EBITDA + 3x FY23 sales for its e-comm business.